1. Communal-Familial Moral Relations
The first structure of moral-emotional relations is the
Communal-Familial, sometimes called the social. Logically second in the
sequence (starting with Transcendence) it is the primary form of human
relational attachment and begins at birth. It is the source of identity and the
foundation for much of the way life will be lived. While it is of limited
practical usefulness in many social circumstances, it is still common and the
driver of much organizational motivation and the guide to many practices.
Figure 1: The bounded circle in the context of the great
abyss of existence
One lives as a self in relation to others. The simplest
relational dynamic is between the self and all others without distinguishing
the unique nature of others. They are merely others as a whole, those outside
of the self. The simplest visual metaphor for conceptualizing such ambiguous
others is to imagine the boundary conditions as a single line enclosing space,
i.e. as a circle (or in three dimensions, a sphere). When one considers the
meta-relational dynamic of oneself in relation to all others the primal concern
is whether one belongs, that is, is one inside or outside the circle. One is
either inside the circle and all identity conditions of the circle apply, or
one is outside because some significant component of the identity circle does
not apply. One is like or unlike, part of or excluded from the set of the
whole.
If one is on the inside of the circle one is a part of a
collective identity. This perspective is a tool that allows us as individuals
to work with the experience of being part of something and give it relational
shape so that it is meaningful in larger terms that can be manipulated. The
experience of belonging is not one with a great deal of nuance (due to or appropriately
reflected in the metaphoric circle) but it is a very powerful emotional sense
and an important way of understanding one’s relational existence. We all want
to “belong” and find deep meaning in doing so. It provides a sense of location,
safety, and coherence. Being part of the circle gives our often fragmented
lives meaning, so some circles of inclusion, at some point, are important to
each one of us.
The body of the circle is uniform, a space of containment
and a place of constancy. This is normally the realm of the family or the
intense affinitive social group. Members share a name or other symbols (or
participatory experiences) of shared identity. Within the circle all is/are
essentially equivalent, or of identical value in relation to the other component
parts of the circle. Within the circle there is nothing to distinguish one part
from another since there really are no parts.
As a guide to moral action the circle can be seen as having two
cognitively useful characteristics, identity (boundary) and equality (internal
state). It is the realm of economic relations of sharing, altruism, or
self-sacrificial generosity since what defines one’s value is the boundary or
one’s identity (Fiske, 1991). Guiding the moral behaviour of the members is the
strength of the boundary in combination with the symbolic characteristics of
identity. The more absolute the boundary (the steeper the entry threshold) the
more those within will have a strong sense of identity, a feeling of inclusion,
and a commitment to internal altruism. A well protected boundary is likely to
produce a sense of security or place such as “home.”
From the viewpoint of an active participant in the circle it
has no external references. There is no meaningful “other” to which it relates.
The rules of the circle only apply to the circle and are irrelevant to all
outside the circle. Their meaning is found in their non-participation in the
framework of real meaning. Thus there is
a moral elimination of all those who are outside the circle. It is not a
question of difference but of moral non-existence. This makes the
identity-group in some respects a socially destructive moral presence. While it
may be of value to its participants, it does not inherently encourage positive
relations with others. Under some conditions it could be a source of violence
toward others (Fiske, 1991).
While such experiences of identity are common, they are not
routine. Even for families, for whom it is probably the dominant moral
framework, much of their time is spent in relation to external bodies and
larger social groupings through the use of other relational frameworks. While
the family has a strong moral character, its members will be unlikely to
perceive the world effectively through the boundary state. A more flexible arrangement
of objects is needed in order to create the conditions for a more cooperative
social state. More abstractly, the circle may be applied to any human
conditions defining identity. This especially includes the nation-state or
other important foci of group identity. Any context that leads to the
expression of some sense of “I am _____” suggest this moral-emotional
framework.
In terms of existing moral or ethical systems, this
structure is essentially identical to what Fiske (1991, 2004) identifies as the
relational structure of Communal Sharing. It also fits as the operant structure
behind Haidt’s (2012) moral flavours of Sanctity/degradation and
Loyalty/betrayal. Most religious moralities encompass or build upon this
relational dynamic. As a source of identity and thus of motivation for many, it
is a relatively accessible way to motivate collective action, especially in as
much as it might trigger what Haidt identifies as our collective personal
mindset—the place where we become a group rather than individuals. Thus it is
possible its most powerful moral use is its extension to justify tribalism,
nationalism or ethno-centrism. Still, regardless of its power to shape
identity, on its own this moral metaphor provides little to guide complex
interaction. Additional frameworks are required for any complex human
encounter.
Table 1. Concepts and their place
In Circle
|
Out of Circle
|
|
Generosity |
Chaos |
|
Belonging |
Terror(ist) |
|
Name/family |
The ‘other’ |
|
Self-sacrifice |
Garbage |
|
Mother/Father-land |
Genocide |
|
Altruism |
Impure |
|
Us |
Them |
Virtue Ethics
Some forms of virtue and feminist ethics appear to be rooted
in this moral-emotional framework. The ancient Greek, Aristotle (384-322 BCE),
developed this school of ethics based on close observation regarding how groups
of people decide what is good. As groups with a coherent identity and mutual
commitments human beings identify what they believe to be good and bad
behaviours and outcomes. From this it is possible to develop lists of what are
good and bad things to do (lists of virtues and vices) tied to the perception
of what creates the group’s boundary or identity. These lists of virtues are
fostered through the stories groups tell about themselves and the world around
them, and by the experiences of those groups that create their identity
(MacIntyre, 1966).
Virtue ethics have been very popular with religious groups
and are the basis for much of traditional tribal or clan life (Weiner, 2013)
but they are also the basis around which many laws and regulations are
developed and implemented in more complex social situations. Groups of all
kinds have a strong interest in developing lists of both virtues and vices by
which they can guide or control their members. Honour turns out to be an
important way many human beings make decision about themselves in relation to
the world as a whole.
In the contemporary world feminists have seen the virtues as
a way of approaching a more humane ethics than that of what are identified as
more patriarchal virtues inherent in other ethical approaches. While feminists
may not necessarily share much with religious adherents to this perspective
they do agree that identity is critical to how one behaves in all realms of
life. Thus a feminist may say “the personal is political” while a Christian may
say “God weighs every action” and disagree profoundly about the details of
life. But what they have both indicated is that by participation in a certain
identity, either womanhood or Christianity a moral and ethical claim is being
made on everything one does.
Organizational Applications
While businesses do not normally formally invoke virtue
ethics or ethics of identity in their ethical statements, all businesses call
upon this form of moral-emotional relationship between organizational members.
It is particularly useful for drawing them together in a relative unity as
opposed to those in other organizations, especially competitors, or the world
as a whole. It is expressed in language like “Let’s be part of the team,” or a
question like “Is everyone feeling happy about where we are at?” It is critical
for organizational success that this form of moral-emotional reasoning be a
daily part of participant life as it keeps people focused on the values of the
organization, reflective of and contributing toward keep points of image and
identity, and looking out for the well-being of other staff without worrying
about compensation. Typically, a group facing adversity will tend to emphasize
its group cohesion and identity using this type of moral-emotional framework.
Often it means taking on a name and being able to identify markers of common
culture, such as clothing, language, or attitudes to specific others (other
work teams, competitors, men/women, bosses, customers, etc.). The result can be
strong esprit de corps and high productivity despite adverse conditions.
However, in organizational contexts communal-familial
relational dynamics tend to breed in-group thinking and self-protective
dynamics around sub-groups. A strong team has strong boundaries which make it
difficult to integrate new members or react responsibly to problems generated
by any one team member. It can become increasingly difficult, or even
impossible, to obtain support of externally generated change which challenges
aspects of group identity or well-being. There is a tendency to turn on
outsiders including legitimate authorities, at such points. The result is that
organizations need to ensure that all groups are closely monitored to ensure
the negatives from strong group identity are being minimized. This may mean
breaking up groups. Better yet is to ensure there is a larger and positive
institutional identity with which to broaden the sense of group participation.
Group members need to know they are there to serve the larger group needs and
dependent upon that larger group for long-term existence.
References & Additional Readings
Etzioni, A.
(1988). The Moral Dimension: Towards a
new economics. New York: The Free Press.
Fiske, A.P.
(1991). Structures of Social Life: The
four elementary forms of human relations. New York: Macmillan.
Fiske, A. P.
(2004). Relational Models Theory 2.0. Relational
Models Theory: A contemporary overview, ed. Nick Haslam, pp. 3-26. Mahwah
NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Haidt,
Jonathan. (2012). The Righteous Mind: Why
good people are divided by politics and religion. New York: Pantheon Books.
MacIntyre,
Alasdair. (1966). A Short History of
Ethics: A history of moral philosophy from the Homeric age to the twentieth
century. New York NY: Macmillan.
Solomon, R. C.
(1992). Ethics and Excellence:
Cooperation and integrity in Business. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Weiner, M.
(2013). The Rule of the Clan: What an
ancient form of social organization reveals about the future of individual
freedom. New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux.
Etzioni, A.
(1988). The Moral Dimension: Towards a
new economics. New York: The Free Press.
Fiske, A.P.
(1991). Structures of Social Life: The
four elementary forms of human relations. New York: Macmillan.
Fiske, A. P.
(2004). Relational Models Theory 2.0. Relational
Models Theory: A contemporary overview, ed. Nick Haslam, pp. 3-26. Mahwah
NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Haidt,
Jonathan. (2012). The Righteous Mind: Why
good people are divided by politics and religion. New York: Pantheon Books.
MacIntyre,
Alasdair. (1966). A Short History of
Ethics: A history of moral philosophy from the Homeric age to the twentieth
century. New York NY: Macmillan.
Solomon, R. C.
(1992). Ethics and Excellence:
Cooperation and integrity in Business. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Weiner, M.
(2013). The Rule of the Clan: What an
ancient form of social organization reveals about the future of individual
freedom. New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux.
Search Terms:
Aristotle, Virtue Ethics, Feminist Ethics, Religious Ethics